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MULTIPLE POST-TRIAL LITIGATION IN
CRIMINAL CASES
RALPH M. HOLMAN*
URING the past fifteen years, trial and appellate courts, partic-
ularly in urban areas, have become glutted with criminal trials
and appeals to the detriment of not only criminal litigation, but
civil litigation as well. This article concerns the repetitious nature
of post-trial litigation in criminal cases.
Before the judicial branch of government can justifiably request the
legislative branch to provide additional judicial manpower and facili-
ties, it is necessary that we be sure that the facilities which we have
are being used efficiently and rationally. It is my thesis that they are
not being so used. We have two systems, state and federal, which are
being operated as if they were entirely independent of each other,
when, in actuality, they are not. State court involvement in the
criminal field is presently under the almost complete domination of
the federal courts.1  Such a condition has been created by the
Supreme Court of the United States through enlargement of federal
constitutional concepts to the extent that they encompass almost
every facet of the investigation and adjudication of state criminal
cases, through the broadened use of the fourteenth amendment,2 and
* JUSTICE HOLMAN is an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Oregon.
He is a member of the Oregon State Bar and has been active in the field of judicial
administration as a circuit judge for more than twenty years.
1. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), wherein the United States Su-
preme Court held that the federal district courts could order evidentiary hearings
on federal claims which had already been litigated in the state court. See also
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
2. To date, the United States Supreme Court has incorporated through the
"due process" clause of the fourteenth amendment: the fourth amendment pro-
hibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures," Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961); fifth amendment privilege against "self-incrimination," Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964); sixth amendment "right to counsel," Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); sixth amendment guaranty of an accused's right to a "speedy
trial," Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); sixth amendment guaranty of ac-
cused's "right of confrontation," Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); and eighth
amendment guaranty against "cruel and unusual punishment," Robinson v. Cal-
ifornia, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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through the enlargement of the scope of inquiry under federal habeas
corpus. 3
This has been one of the greatest changes in the legal field in the
history of our country and has come about in the short space of
approximately twenty years. Much ink has been spilled and many
words have been used in arguing the merits of what has occurred.4
It is not my purpose to add to this controversy, because further dis-
cussion is futile. The transfer of authority over a state's criminal
cases from the state to the federal courts is an accomplished fact.5
Only history will tell whether the transfer was wise or not.
This sudden change has come as a great shock to most older mem-
bers of the profession. In retrospect, it is strange that we should
have been surprised. The same thing had been going on in all facets
of our life long prior to the time it became apparent in criminal
investigation and litigation.' It was just a little later in coming into
our field of endeavor. The power of the federal government has dis-
placed the power of the state. Perhaps this makes sense, because
state boundaries mean little today. We live as a "national" people
rather than as a "state" people. Our manner of living has made the
locality in which we reside of less and less relevance. Furthermore,
many new problems, and some old ones, cannot be readily solved on
a state-by-state basis. Be that as it may, the transfer of power from
state to federal government has been the greatest single phenomenon
of American government to occur during this century.
The purpose of this article is to suggest that perhaps our existing
3. See, e.g., Tucker v. Payton, 357 F.2d 115 (1966), wherein the court of ap-
peals stated that federal habeas corpus is available to a state prisoner to attack his
conviction, since its denial would have the effect of delaying eligibility for parole.
See also, Note, 80 HARv. L. REV. 422 (1966).
4. See Kelman, Federal Habeas Corpus as a Source of New Constitutional
Requirements for State Criminal Procedure, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 46 (1967); Mayers,
Federal Review of State Convictions: Some Proposals for Change, 5 AM. CRIM.
L.Q. 66 (1967); Note, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 696 (1964); Comment, 16 CATHOLIC
U.L. REV. 401 (1967); Note, 3 U. SAN. FRAN. L. REV. 450 (1969).
5. See supra note 3.
6. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wick-
ard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948);
see generally Wabash & St. T. OP. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
In connection with national versus local labor regulations, see Hill v. Florida,
325 U.S. 538 (1945); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garman, 359 U.S. 236
(1959).
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and traditional federal and state court structures, and our means of
using them in the criminal law field, are not very well adapted to our
present requirements and conditions in view of the complete domina-
tion of the field by the federal courts. To illustrate this point, let me
outline the usual course in Oregon of a criminal case which has been
investigated and tried without error. I have no reason to believe that
this is not typical of most other states. The defendant is tried
and convicted in the state trial court of general jurisdiction. He
appeals his conviction to the Oregon Court of Appeals, an inter-
mediate appellate court. The conviction is affirmed. He petitions
the Supreme Court of Oregon for a writ of review and the writ is
denied. He then commences proceedings under the Oregon Post
Conviction Procedure Act,7 which is a means of asserting in a state
court that he has been deprived of a state or federal constitutional
right in his original criminal investigation or prosecution. The mat-
ter is tried in the trial court of general jurisdiction. The petition for
relief is denied. Defendant then appeals his denial of post-conviction
relief to the Oregon Court of Appeals. The denial of relief is there
affirmed. A petition for a writ of review to the Oregon Supreme
Court is made and denied. The defendant then files a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in the Federal District Court for the District
of Oregon. A trial is had and relief is denied. An appeal is taken
to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the denial
of relief by way of habeas corpus is affirmed. A petition for a writ
of certiorari is brought to the United States Supreme Court, and the
writ is denied.8
There have now been three trials, three appellate reviews with
written opinions, and three considerations by higher appellate courts
which have refused further review. Try explaining the necessity for
such triplicate procedure to a layman and see what sort of response
you receive. The layman will be unable to comprehend the necessity
for this sort of procedure and will immediately deride the judicial
process and express his disrespect for it. I submit that the layman is
correct.
7. ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 138.510-.680 (1967).
8. Even then, litigation may not be an end. The usual principles of res judicata
are inapplicable to successive habeas corpus proceedings in federal courts. Smith
v. Yeager, 393 U.S. 122 (1968); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
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Post-conviction acts similar to that of Oregon have been enacted
by many states,9 because it was thought that they would keep state
cases out of federal courts if a means were provided in state courts
for vindicating federal constitutional rights after regular appellate
review was exhausted. 10 Oregon would now be in a better position
if no such law existed. It merely provides for turning over the state
legal machinery another time before the case goes its inevitable way
to the federal courts. In some cases, of course, relief is granted.
However, in the vast bulk of cases, it is merely another step on the
way to the federal courts.
Presently, there is no practical manner whereby the described pro-
gression of the average criminal case can be constitutionally pre-
vented, regardless of the merits of the litigation. About ninety per
cent of the convicted criminals are indigents." All costs are borne
by public funds. Regardless of how poor his chances may be, a con-
victed defendant cannot be expected to do other than devote his time
to continuous post-trial litigation. He has nothing to lose.
When almost every convicted defendant is going to avail himself
of his complete post-trial rights regardless of the merit of his case,
does it make sense to run the litigation through two different court
systems? What happens in the state system after conviction in the
trial court is, in most instances, relatively unimportant, because almost
every facet of the case involves a federal constitutional question and
therefore is going to have complete federal review. If complete fed-
eral review is the rule regardless of whether state review has been had,
we cannot justify the maintenance of state post-trial litigation, appel-
late or otherwise. It is true that state review sometimes results in the
invalidation of convictions, thus terminating post-trial litigation with-
out resort to the federal courts. However, we must presume that
these convictions would also have been invalidated had their review
9. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 122-1 to 122-7 (1969); MD. CRIM.
CODE, art. 27, § 645A (1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to 15-222 (1965);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-408.1 to 7-408.8 (Supp. 1967).
10. See generally Fairchild, Post Conviction Rights and Remedies in Wisconsin,
Wis. L. REV. 52 (1965); Raper, Post Conviction Remedies, 19 Wyo. L.J. 213
(1965); Note, 18 DRAKE L. REV. 98 (1968); Note, 21 MAINE L. REV. 241 (1969).
11. Oshman, Justice for the Poor-Whither Next?, 27 BRIEF CASE 135 (1969);
Note, 1 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. REV. 326 (1967); Sargant, Legal Aid in Criminal
Appeals, 117 N. J. L. 1067 (1967); Summers, Tilted Scales and Criminal Jus-
tice: The Plight of the Indigent Defendant, 5 CRIM. L. BULL. 508 (1969).
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gone directly to the federal system from the state trial court. At the
present time, the real Supreme Court of Oregon for criminal litigation
is the Federal District Court or the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.
I suggest that if the defendant asserts a deprivation of a federal
constitutional right in his appeal, or by any other post-trial means,
the appeal or other litigation should go in the first instance di-
rectly into the federal system. The question immediately presents
itself: how will questions of non-constitutional consequence be de-
cided which are present in the same case? The answer is that federal
courts will decide them in accordance with state law as they do in
many civil cases.
If there were a means of screening out meritless post-trial litigation
through a public defender or other official who examines the record
for error, the difficulty could be substantially solved. However,
there is no practical manner of doing this under present constitutional
concepts. 12
It is important that courts enjoy the confidence and faith of the
people. Courts have no effective way of enforcing their judgments
or decrees other than through the willingness of the citizenry to see
that the results of litigation are enforced. When courts lose public
confidence, they are no longer effective instruments of government.
We cannot expect public confidence unless court business is conducted
in a rational and efficient manner. It is absolutely necessary that
some terminal facilities be installed in post-trial criminal litigation.
The public, justifiably, cannot understand how criminal cases can be
re-litigated interminably.
All of us have known of inhumane situations where convicted
murderers have remained in death row for ten to fifteen years while
post-trial litigation wends its interminable way. 13 Such a thing should
not be possible and justifiably breeds public contempt for the ju-
dicial process. During post-trial litigation, the court has only two
choices-allow the defendant bail or incarcerate him. If a person
has been lawfully convicted, the public is entitled to have him segre-
12. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1966).
13. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Chessman v. People, 205
F.2d 128, cert. den. 346 U.S. 916 (1953), reh. den. 347 U.S. 908 (1954); see gen-
erally Bedau, Capital Punishment in Oregon, 1903-04, 45 ORE. L. REV. 1 (1965).
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gated from society, if its protection so requires, and he should not
be out on bail. On the other hand, if a person has not been law-
fully convicted, he is entitled to his freedom or a new trial promptly,
and should not be incarcerated for years while post-trial litigation
continues. Justice can only serve both sides if the issue of whether
error has been committed is determined promptly.14
It can be argued that this voluminous post-trial litigation is neces-
sary to make doubly sure that an innocent man is not wrongfully
convicted. All of us abhor the thought that an innocent man might
have been convicted. This is as it should be. On the other hand,
there must be a limit to criminal post-trial procedures if they are to
remain a useful and efficient tool for the purpose of review. It is
possible to have so many safeguards that the system will no longer
function. The only way that there can be absolute assurance that an
innocent person will not be convicted is to prosecute no one. It is
human to err. However, there comes a point when the insertion of
further safeguards is self-defeating because the result is too cumber-
some to be useful. The public will tolerate only so much duplication
and inefficiency, and it is time we put our house in order.
14. See Committee Report, Appellate Delay in Criminal Cases: A Report, 2 AM.
CRIM. L.Q. 150 (1964); Covington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals:
The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV.
542 (1969).
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